The Apocalyptic Imagination and the Fundamentalist Mindset by Strozier, Charles B.
New England Journal of Public Policy
Volume 29 | Issue 1 Article 7
3-20-2017
The Apocalyptic Imagination and the
Fundamentalist Mindset
Charles B. Strozier
John Jay College, Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and Training and Research Institute in Self Psychology,
cstrozier@jjay.cuny.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp
Part of the International Relations Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Public
Policy Commons, Social Psychology Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in New England Journal of
Public Policy by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Strozier, Charles B. (2017) "The Apocalyptic Imagination and the Fundamentalist Mindset," New England Journal of Public Policy: Vol.
29 : Iss. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol29/iss1/7
New England Journal of Public Policy 
 
 1 
The Apocalyptic Imagination and the Fundamentalist Mindset 
 
Charles B. Strozier 
John Jay College, Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and Training and 
Research Institute in Self Psychology 
 
This article explores the psychological meanings of the apocalyptic imagination in what I call a 
fundamentalist mindset. That mindset has its own long history but is newly relevant in the nuclear 
age. We no longer need God to bring about ultimate destruction. There are many facets of the 
fundamentalist mindset (for example, its intense literalism), but the focus in the article is on two: 
its kairotic sense of time and its rampant paranoia. These two facets interact synergistically 
around violence that is experienced by those who revel in it as moral in a totalistic sense. Killing 
becomes healing. The evil other, indeed evil itself, must be totally eradicated. If that can happen 
as a kind of final solution, the result is ultimate salvation in an apocalyptic remaking of the world. 
We must understand these dynamics that are all too human but newly significant with the means 
of such destruction in human hands.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
“Apocalypsis” is a transliteration of the Greek word apokalypsis, meaning “to uncover or 
disclose.” Within the Judeo-Christian tradition it means the specific ways in which God reveals 
himself or herself to humans. For nonliteral Christians, such “revelation” of the ultimate can come 
close to what is called “insight” in psychoanalysis, or that profound understanding that connects 
thoughts and feelings at their deepest levels. Prophecy is the form of our access to that apocalypse, 
though some scholars have distinguished the prophetic from the apocalyptic traditions. In 
prophetism, it is argued, we are called to a change of heart, to repentance in the present, and to a 
new way of living. It is a call to efficacy and a challenge to change so that we can avoid catastrophe. 
In the apocalyptic, or the already-determined future, hope is deferred, which is why it is so often 
associated with the poor, the broken-hearted, the oppressed—and why it is so often associated with 
violence. 
Endism, as I called it in 1994, is the location of self in some future narrative.1 I use that idea 
as a psychological construct but recognize the endist narrative is also not one thing but has itself 
evolved historically from 11,500 years ago to the Egyptian Book of the Dead in the thirteenth 
century BCE, with its exotic ideas of the second and final, ultimate death; to the early Zoroastrians 
some six centuries later, with their simpler and more focused ideas that have so influenced the 
Judeo-Christian traditions; to the later biblical prophets in the Hebrew Bible, including Daniel (ca. 
200 BCE); to John of Patmos in 95 CE, who created in Revelation the Ur text of apocalypse for 
all the Abrahamic faiths and most others as well, a vast image of God’s destruction that makes 
him, in the words of James W. Jones, a “divine terrorist”2 
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and remarkably stirs apocalyptic energies in distant realms;3 to Joachim of Fiore (1135–1202) in 
the Middle Ages; but in no way more important than in our recent historical discovery of the 
ultimate power of the destruction with nuclear weapons and increasingly with biological agents 
and even the potential for the end of life with the most radical possibilities as a result of climate 
change.4 
Nuclear weapons and the endist narrative are at the heart of things. We attribute to the Divine 
the power to create and destroy, that is, of beginnings and endings, but we are most anxious about 
death (and Christianity the most anxious of the world’s religions). We all die, and the extension of 
that foreknowledge—which is what most decisively distinguishes us from the higher primates—
to the potential end of human life itself was originally a creative force in the making of culture 
many millennia ago. The human reached out to the Divine. Over time and with traditions of 
ritualization, culture assigned the task of imagining the end to three important but relatively 
marginal groups: priests and mystics, artists such as Hieronymus Bosch, and psychotics (which is 
why they were often revered in premodern societies). The apocalyptic remained at the edge of 
culture, but such intellectual and spiritual themes were neither static nor predictable. The sense of 
collective endings ebbed and flowed with historical change. During and after times of great crisis, 
such as the plague in Europe between 1348 and 1351 when more than a third of the European 
population was wiped out, apocalyptic thinking more forcibly entered the mainstream as self-
flagellating cults proliferated and hundreds of thousands of women were burned as witches in the 
next two hundred years. During times of relative peace, as in the eighteenth century, it then receded 
back to the margins of imagination.  
Splitting the atom and the destruction that event releases alters the dynamics of our sense of 
divine power. It takes away from God the power to end life on earth. The apocalyptic now resides 
in human hands. Nuclear weapons—and increasingly other means of destruction—shift the 
agency. We do not need God in the same way, an idea that is deeply confusing. The apocalyptic 
narrative has always been simultaneously one of violence and redemption, of endings that are new 
beginnings, of vast death that cleanses the world of sin and leads to new life. There is hope, as 
exemplified in the role of the Messiah, whether he, or she, comes or comes again. But in a nuclear 
end there is only death. It is an entirely “pointless” apocalypse, bringing only ultimate death and 
not renewal, as Robert Jay Lifton put it in 1979 in The Broken Connection.5 All of this suggests to 
me that we therefore live in the present in our imagination as survivors of future apocalypse. The 
shadow of the future casts doubt on our capacity to inhabit it.  
These reflections that grew out of my field work in New York fundamentalist churches in the 
early 1990s and resulted in Apocalypse: On the Psychology of Fundamentalism in America, along 
with my experience of 9/11 (and my extensive interviews with survivors and witnesses for Until 
the Fires Stopped Burning6), along with the new meanings of terrorism in the world, led me in the 
last decade to think more deeply about what I would call a “fundamentalist mindset” and a book 
with that title that I conceived and published in 2010 along with some colleagues. Because of our 
new relationship to these ultimate issues, it is not surprising we live in world awash in apocalyptic 
themes and new forms of fundamentalism have sprouted like a disease of epidemic proportions. 
There is, I think, a fundamentalist mindset, rooted in the past but newly energized that transcends 
its particularity in contemporary religious movements. Islamists, for example, have fueled the 
global jihad, evangelicals have pushed Christianity to the right in this country, and the settlers in 
Israel have evoked a new millennialism about Jewish land not seen in centuries. They overlap in 
curious ways. The haredi rabbis and Islamist imans wear the same beards.7 Christian preachers in 
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Alabama ranting about women or homosexuals can sound strangely like jihadi fanatics. And so it 
goes. 
Such religious fundamentalist movements can be quite noisy and seem to define the 
phenomenon. But the mindset of fundamentalism is something more deeply ingrained in the self 
that finds expression in a variety of human institutions, including religion but no means restricted 
to it, and has a history that gives it protean meanings over many centuries. Norman Cohn, for 
example, has described cultic groups at the fringes of society in the Middle Ages.8 The “Terror” 
of the French Revolution realized the paranoid and destructive potentials of a revolution that 
otherwise expanded human freedom. Nazism was undoubtedly the most important fundamentalist, 
millennial movement in the twentieth century, if not in human history. The current Tea Party 
movement in the United States merges populist and racist ideas in a millennial movement aimed 
at renewal of politics; its violent potential was evident in the presidential campaign of Donald 
Trump. The individual and the collective, that is, psychology and history, work synergistically to 
create, diminish, aggravate, and heal the many forms of fundamentalism in religion, politics, and 
culture. 
There are many aspects of the fundamentalist mindset that could be discussed and that are 
relevant for its full understanding. Its most noisy dimension is its tendency toward literalism and 
dualistic thinking, but it is also true that those who inhabit that psychological space are susceptible 
to charismatic leaders and usually experience some kind of totalistic conversion that marks their 
full entry into their defined communities.9 Each of these dimensions of the fundamentalist mindset 
deserves extensive discussion and its own article (at least). What I focus on here, however, as it is 
perhaps less obvious and infrequently noted in its psychological depth, is the relation of the 
apocalyptic to time and paranoia in the fundamentalist mindset. 
First, time. Phillip Rieff in his wonderful 1962 study Freud: The Mind of a Moralist 
characterizes Freud’s ideas in terms of kairotic time.10 Cartesian time, the basis for the creation of 
the modern, is chromatic, evenly spaced, regular, and entirely predictable, able to be measured 
with amazing degrees of accuracy. We would not have cars or bridges, even cities, without 
Cartesian time. Kairotic time, in contrast, as in Einstein’s general theory of relativity, comes in 
many shapes and is irregular and uneven. Freud located key transformative moments in childhood 
around which crystalizes all that matters then, or later, and that he named the Oedipus Complex. 
His theories of drive and development that he felt grew out of the Oedipus Complex are highly 
questionable a century later, but he was prescient about identifying moments in childhood (and 
later) that are profound and transformative in their meanings and that we would now call traumatic. 
Freud’s philosophical approach to time has shaped the central focus now in psychoanalysis on 
trauma. For in trauma, a black hole of misery collapses time and space. 
The idea of a black hole is central to understanding apocalyptic time, which is deeply kairotic. 
Such time is not linear or homogeneous but is weighted by value and experienced in unevenly and 
discordantly. Like trauma experienced by an individual, such experience of time is psychologically 
and spiritually different from history as we know it. In the apocalyptic the only meaningful future 
event is the transformative end of the world, followed by salvation. Apocalyptic believers are not 
living within time but rather escape history by destroying time, thereby freeing themselves of 
responsibility for the world. Kairotic time is always running out, and urgent expectation of the end 
frames believers’ logical, spiritual, and ethical deliberation. 
What is troubling in this narrative is that the transformative moment at the end of time in the 
apocalyptic imagination is always one of great violence. It is a death-drenched story. The book of 
Revelation, for example, with its three waves of destruction unfolding in patterns of sevens, with 
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seven digressions of great significance folded into the text, depicts rivers of blood that run up to 
the bridles of horses, Satan unloosed from the depths, and an angry Messiah riding a white horse 
with a suggestive phallic sword coming out of his mouth. But out of such violence comes 
redemption. Death is regenerative, as the new heaven and a shining Jerusalem with twelve gates 
and foundations “garnished with all manner of precious stones” welcomes the reborn. Sinners, in 
contrast, forever swim in the lake of fire, an image of brutal revenge for the despised other. 
The narrative fits the more extreme dualistic fantasies of paranoia that feed on the desire to 
destroy the evil persecutor. Such fantasies lurk in the heart of troubled individuals but also have a 
place in the collective, that is, in history, in terms that my colleague David Terman has called a 
“paranoid gestalt.” 11  Again, such ideas have grounding in the hopeful. Among religious 
fundamentalist believers there is nothing more basic to their belief system than hope for the 
coming, or return, of the Messiah. For secular millennial movements, such as the Nazis and their 
vague notions of the thousand-year Reich, the redemptive goals are elusive but equally central to 
their aspirations. But in the apocalyptic narrative there can be ultimate salvation only with the 
absolute destruction of the world and its evils. That evil can be constructed as counterrevolutionary 
forces for Robespierre, Jews, and other “life unworthy of life” for the Nazis, and echoes of such 
ideas among the more radical right-wing elements in contemporary U.S. politics. The end of evil 
through collective death, however, overcomes death itself in a remaking of the world that brings 
with it powerful hope. This transcendent process totalizes the other, requiring radical dualisms and 
evokes evil in paranoid ways. This remarkable link between paranoia and the apocalyptic gives us 
insight into the violent potentials in the fundamentalist mindset.  
Certain things are clear about paranoia. Someone in its grip lives in a world of heated 
exaggerations, in which empathy has been leached out and where humor, creativity, and wisdom 
are absent. The paranoid lives in a world of shame and humiliation, of suspiciousness, aggression, 
and dualisms that separate out all good from pure evil. The paranoid is grandiose and 
megalomaniacal, self-centered to a fault, and lives within the apocalyptic. Many of those in the 
grip of paranoia are very smart, and I have long felt it may be the pathology of choice for the 
gifted. There is no question that paranoia focuses all of one’s cognitive abilities in ways that can 
make one’s schemes intellectually daunting. 
In paranoia everything is intense and of the moment, and time is forever running out. The 
paranoid’s understanding of history is truly diseased. Great forces are arrayed against the paranoid; 
virtually the workings of the cosmos itself are aligned to punish and persecute the victim who, it 
can be said, suffers from history. One is helpless and beaten down, but this keen sense of 
victimization and negative grandiosity (“No one has suffered as much as I have in the face of this 
persecution”) readily turns positive in its most malignant form (”I am actually greater than my 
tormentor”; “I am the creator”; “I am Napoleon”; “I am Jesus”). That is the source of the secret 
joy one often sees in the depressed eyes of the paranoid. The conspiracies that abound in the mind 
of the paranoid, furthermore, are not just isolated events that affect him or her but are the very 
motive force of history. There is nothing of consequence to understand in the world except how 
these large conspiracies work, which explains why paranoia is so totally self-absorbing. 
Violence lurks in this nexus of paranoia and the apocalyptic. The other becomes the 
embodiment of evil. As such, that malignant other deserves not simply to be punished but can be, 
and in more extreme historical situations of crisis (or, as Lifton has put it, “atrocity producing 
situations”) must be, dispensed with.12 It is not simply an allowance to kill. Killing becomes an 
obligation and to act against the perceived tormentor in the name of self-protection is to become a 
savior. Violence heals and redeems. Because one acts on behalf of absolute righteousness, a sense 
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that history itself is being cured, killing becomes healing and is therefore an ethical obligation. 
People commit personal violence for all kinds of idiosyncratic reasons. They murder loved ones, 
rape, plunder, rob, and steal for selfish, mean, and sometimes psychotic reasons. But people 
commit genocide out of a moral purpose to cleanse the world of evil. You cannot kill on that scale 
without a sense of higher purpose, though one that is tragically perverse. 
In its deeper and totalized meanings, paranoia thus becomes apocalyptic. I have mentioned 
the dramatic historical examples of the French Revolution when, between September 1793 and 
July 1794, tens of thousands died and over sixteen thousand heads literally rolled off the guillotine 
in Paris in a frenzy of revolutionary fervor, and the Holocaust, in which millions died and were 
incinerated in those dreadful crematoria. But with nuclear and other ultimate weapons in the world, 
we live now with the apocalyptic more firmly planted in our minds because of our new relationship 
with death. It lurks just below the surface, often in confusing ways. 
Take, for example, the way 9/11 took shape. On that day in what I have described as “zones 
of sadness,” survivors and witnesses reacted in horror to the death that rained around them in lower 
Manhattan.13  Many were deeply traumatized in ways that endured. But there was a striking 
dimension of that trauma: part of its meaning was the way it evoked nuclear threat. Miranda, on 
the sixty-seventh floor of the south tower, a professional woman who had worked in the World 
Trade Center during the 1993 bombing, rushed to the door to leave when the first plane hit the 
north tower. The scene in the stairwells was already scary, but when the second plane rammed into 
her building, the stairwell filled with smoke and she dissociated, got confused, and had trouble 
figuring which floor she should exit from. Finally, she found a door that opened onto the plaza on 
the south side and thought a butcher shop had exploded because of all the body parts on the ground, 
an image out of the book of Revelation that was obliterated in the collapse of the towers. 
When the south tower collapsed she headed south to Battery Park and was enveloped in the 
cloud of dust. She assumed a nuclear bomb had gone off. She grabbed her driver’s license for 
future identification and jumped or fell into a nearby bush, where she passed out and remained so 
for several hours. 
Others I talked with saw a mushroom cloud from the plume of the collapsing towers, when 
they were cone-shaped, and were certain nuclear bombs had been dropped; an EMT, a strong 
Roman Catholic, was sure it was the end of the world caused by nuclear weapons as she wandered 
around ground zero in the eerie silence that followed the collapse of both towers. She started crying 
that she had not said goodbye to her daughter. 
In such stories, one sees how the template of a nuclear end lurks just below consciousness, 
ready to be evoked in moments of catastrophe. 9/11 was not apocalyptic. It was an awful event in 
which many people died and the nation was traumatized. Many survivors will never fully recover 
and families who lost loved ones will always live with that sadness. But, while ground zero is 
mostly rebuilt and a grandiose memorial and museum has opened, that is, life has gone on, our 
experience of the disaster was as an apocalyptic event, in no small measure because of our image 
of ultimate destruction. It is there in the self, ready to march across our dreamscapes and poised to 
occupy our minds in moments of trauma. There are many ways such exterminatory images affect 
us in the nuclear age, but however complex, we can be sure they are not benign. 
On 9/11, for example, it happened that the United States experienced the disaster as 
apocalyptic at the moment we had a Christian fundamentalist president who loosely talked of a 
crusade in response. He then stood on the burning and belching pile that Friday, September 14, 
speaking through a bullhorn with his arm around a fireman and promised revenge. By December 
2001, his approval rating was 91 percent as a traumatized nation flocked to his message of violent 
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retribution. What was unleashed were two wars in the Middle East, one utterly stupid and tragic, 
and vast death and dislocation, not to mention the squandering of well over two trillion dollars. I 
don’t believe we are stronger for having survived 9/11. Something broke in us and it will take a 
long time to heal. 
There is hope. I have been thinking about this stuff now for decades and have grown very 
close to those who embrace the apocalyptic—in my interviews with Christian fundamentalists in 
the 1990s when I spent five years going to their churches in New York; with survivors and 
witnesses of 9/11; with many of my traumatized patients after 9/11 (my office is in Greenwich 
Village); with my students in the early years after the disaster, many of whom were traumatized 
firemen and police who had been there and later worked on the pile and took all my courses on 
terrorism to try to understand what had happened; with my relatives in Georgia (my mother-in-
law doesn’t have my books on her coffee table); and in the hugely perplexing experience of having 
my youngest son join the army and fight in Iraq. Sometimes it all touches my soul in confounding 
ways, haunting me with images of violence that leave me shaking. But to understand contemporary 
life, one must grapple with these issues. They are at the heart of what it means to live an examined 
life. At the same time, do not yearn for destruction to remake the world. The only thing that matters 
is a human future, and our most important ethical obligation is to hand off the world and life itself 
to future generations. 
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